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INVASIONS OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY INCOME
TAX PRIVILEGES
FRANKLIN C.

LATCHAM

For a period of over twenty years the eight community property
states' have enjoyed the privilege of dividing the total community
income of the husband and wife between the spouses for income tax
purposes and thus, in the higher income brackets at least, effecting a
sizable reduction in tax liability. 2 The basis for this benefit is found
in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, especially in the
case of Poe v. Sanborn,' wherein the court held that because under the
local law of Washington a wife had a vested interest in one half of
the community property she could therefore file a separate return on
one half of all income earned by the community.
The income tax privilege of the community property states has
long been under attack, both through attempts to induce the court to
overrule the doctrine of Poe v. Seaborn, and through proposals made to
Congress to amend the revenue acts so that the discrepancy would be
eliminated. The purpose herein will be to investigate these attacks
and to evaluate their merits and possibilities of success.
I.

CASE LAW ATTACKS UPON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
INCOME TAX PRIVILEGES

A case recently handed down by the Federal Supreme Court, Commissioner v. Harmon,4 has made the benefits and privileges of the
community property states stand out in even bolder relief. In that
decision a divided court refused to allow a husband and wife, who
elected to come under optional Oklahoma Community Property Act,5
enacted in 1939, the right to divide the community income equally
between them for federal income tax purposes. As a result of this
decision, of course, the privilege of separate returns is also denied
persons coming under the optional Community Property Act of Oregon
passed in 1943.6
A. The Harmon Case and What It Has Done.
In the Harmon case, the respondent and his wife filed their written
election to have the Oklahoma Act, beginning on November 1, 1939,
applied to them and their property. For the period from November 1
to December 31, 1939, they received certain sums constituting corn1

Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana and

Washington.
2 See the report of the House Ways and Means Committee to Congress,

H.R. 5417, H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941), showing the
relatively small number of spouses in community states making separate
returns. The percentages range from 10 to 20 per cent.
3282 U. S. 101 (1930).
165 Sup. Ct. 103, 89 L. ed. adv. ops. 71 (Nov. 20, 1944).
532 OKL. STATS. AxN.
§ 51-46 (1941).
6LAWS OF OREGON, 1943, c. 440.
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munity income under the act and the taxpayer and wife filed separate
returns on such income. The commissioner denied their right.
Both the Circuit Court of Appeals7 and the Tax Court s disagreed
with the commissioner. Each court found the act to be valid and the
case to represent a close enough analogy to the situation in other community property states to warrant a holding for the taxpayer. But
the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts. Mr.
Justice Roberts, speaking for a majority of the court, held that the
provision in the Oklahoma Act allowing the spouses to elect to come
within its provisions distinguished this case from Poe v. Seaborn and,
instead, brought it within the rule of Lucas v. Earl A dissenting
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Black concurred, in which he pointed out the similarities between the
Oklahoma Act and the Washington community property law and
also noted the peculiar position of Poe v. Seaborn in the body of federal
income tax cases.
In order to better understand the Harmon decision, it will be
necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the opinions in Lucas v. Earl
and Poe v. Seaborn, for these were controlling cases in the court's
opinion.
Lucas v. Earl concerned an agreement between a husband and wife,
made in 1901, that any property "either of us now has or may hereafter
acquire... in any way... shall be treated and considered, and hereby
is declared to be received, held, taken, and owned by us as joint tenants,
and not otherwise, with the right of survivorship,"' 0
The taxpayer claimed that the income under this agreement must
be taxed as the joint income of the husband and wife maintaining that
the basic principle of the income tax law is that it is a tax on income
beneficially received, and more technically, "the salary and fees became
the property of Earl and his wife on the very instant when they were
received.""
In regard to this last claim, which so closely touches the community
property argument, the court made the passing remark that however the
case might stand between the husband and wife, he was the only one
who could fulfill the services which as a lawyer he had seaout to
perform and from which the income was being derived.
The real basis of the decision, however, is found in the broad statement that the matter is not to be decided upon "attenuated subleties"
of property law. Instead, said Justice Holmes, it must turn upon a
reasonable construction of the revenue act which taxes the net income of
Commissioner v. Harmon, 139 F. (2d) 211 (C.C.
C. Harmon, 1 T. C. 40 (1942).
9281 U. S. 111 (1930).
BC.

1'Id. at 113.
1"Ibid.

10th, 1943).
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every individual of whatever kind and from whatever source.'
It seemed to the court that the proper import of this act was that it
levied a tax upon the salaries of those who earned them and could not
be escaped "by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even
for a second in the man who earned it.""s
As we have noted, Poe v. Seaborn involved the community property
law of the state of Washington. The claim of the taxpayer was again,
of course, that any earnings of either spouse (principally, of course,
the husband) subject to the community estate, became instantly that
of the community and thus must be taxed as income of both.
But the court immersed itself in the mysteries of the community
property concept and found that the Lucas case "presents quite a
different question from this, because here, by law, the earnings are
never the property of the husband, but that of the community."' 4
In other words, the court was not dealing with a mere private, manmade theory for invoking the blessings of separate returns.1" On the
contrary, here was a system, ancient in the law, which so affected the
earnings of either spouse that immediately as earned they became onehalf the property of the other. Nor did it matter that the husband
had broad powers of control. For Warburton v. White 6 had long
ago pointed out that the husband enjoyed these powers merely as an
agent, not as an owner.
Into which slot, then, should the court fit the slug represented by the
Harmon case: the one marked "Seaborn," or that marked "Earl"?
In answer to this question the majority opinion in the Harmon case
found that there are two types of communities-"consensual and legal."
A consensual community, like that formed by the Oklahoma Act, arises
out of contract and does not differ essentially from the contract in
Lucas v. Earl. A legal community, however, the court pointed out is
"one made an incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of the
State." This was the type involved in Poe v. Seaborn. The fundamental
distinction between the consensual and legal systems, said the court, is
that the former is merely a policy of the state to allow spouses to alter,
2The court was concerned with the Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(a).

Note, also, that the broad sweep of the "attenuated subtleties" phrase has

given the government attorneys a tremendous pragmatic argument against

following ordinary legal concepts in income tax cases. See Bruton, The
Taxation of Family Income, 41 YALE L. J. 1172 (1932).
1- 281 U. S. 111, 115.
14282 U. S. 101, 117.
" In the Seaborn case Roberts, 3., said: "The very assignment in (the
Lucas case) was bottomed on the fact that the earnings would be the
husband's property, else there would have been nothing on which it
could operate. That case presents quite a different case from this, because
here by law, the earnings are never the property of the husband, but that
of the community." 282 U. S., 101, 117. From the standpoint of federal
taxation, it is submitted that this distinction is at least questionable.
16 176 U. S. 484 (1900).
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by contract, the status which otherwise would havebeen the prevailing
common law system, whereas the latter is a system dictated by state'
policy as an incident. to marriage. Other similarities between the two
systems were laid aside because this one factor was sufficient to distinguish the Oklahoma Act from the traditional community property
systems.

The dissenting justices, however, were of the opinion that the
Harmon case could be brought within the rule of Poe v. Seaborn. They
were unable to see any essential difference between the act of marriage
so as to come under the community laws or the act of filing an
election to do SO. 1 7 Under the law of Oklahoma the dissenters found
that once an election is filed the earnings are never those of the husband
but are those of the community so the case of Lucas v. Earl should
no more apply to the Harmon case than it did to that of Poe v. Seaborn.
If by the law of the state, said Justice Douglas, the earnings of the
husband are made the property of the community and not that of
the husband then the federal courts should treat the law of Oklahoma
the same as they do the law, of other states making the same pro17 Both the Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tax Court distinguished
the election provision in the act from the Earl case by finding that such
an election changes, permanently and irrevocably while in force, the
property rights of the spouses and is, therefore, the type of an agreement
that must be distinguished from a mere private contract.
The courts, moreover, could find no distinction in legal effect between a
statute under which a husband and wife elect to have the act apply to
their property in the future and an act which automatically applies unless
expressly revoked by the contract of the spouses. Here the C.C.A. cites
cases and statutes of different community states, among them Rivr. REv.
STAT. § 10572. There is still some doubt in Washington whether that
section allows such a contract but agreements of this type are common.
The courts might have also analogized the situation where a party moves
from a non-community property state to a community state. It certainly
could be said just as easily that a person, by his change of domicile, has
elected to come under the community system, and incidentally, of course,
the resultant tax benefits.
It is interesting to note that in the Tax Court the proponents of the
Oklahoma Act frankly admitted that one of the underlying motives for
the passage of the act was to keep wealthy Oklahomans from being
attracted by the Texas community property benefits. However that may
be, the idea that community property states present a "happy haven" 'for
large income taxpayers now residing in common law property states is
not borne out by the facts. There has been no mass exodus of wealth to
community states as a whole. And, furthermore, except in Idaho and
Texas where income from separate property is community property ,(See
Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act-A Comparative Study,
LA. L. REv. 575 (1940); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799
(1925)) separate property brought into community property states will
remain the separate property of each spouse, unless, as in Washington,
separate property can be changed to community property. See Volz v.
Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920). But notice that a change of
separate property to community property affects the corpus as well as the
income and thus the original separate owner loses his full control over
the property. This factor presents a definite deterrent to such a change.
See Altman, Community Property, Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in
the Revenue Act, 16- TAx MAG. 138 (1938), for a discussion of the problems
here involved.
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nouncement. The minority also points out that after the election is
made the Oklahoma Act treats property the same as does the Washington law-a fact the majority concedes. And, furthermore, in most
community states the spouses can change separate property to community property and separate returns are allowed on income from
such property. 18 Is this not a contract made after marriage they ask?
The dissenters deny that they are upholding Poe v. Seaborn; they
merely state that if Poe v. Seaborn is good law then the court should
follow it in this instance. If, however, the majority is refusing to follow
Poe v. Seaborn because it has bad consequences, then, say the minority,
that case, which has been carved out as an exception to the general
rules of liability for income tax cases, should be reexamined.
As a result of the Harmon decision the status of the "old line" community property states remains the same. An attempt to reach their
income tax benefits and privileges has failed. The basis for their
privilege, Poe v. Seaborn, has again been upheld and followed. The
minority opinion, however, makes it very clear that it does not approve
of the holding in Poe v. Seaborn and points out in unmistakable
language why."9 It must be remembered, too, that the Harmon case
does not present a direct attack upon the Seaborn case, the majority
were merely content to follow its doctrine without reexamining its
validity. There is a possibility, then, that if, because of recent cases,
the soundness of the court's position in Poe v. Seaborn should again
come squarely before the court that it might overrule the case. The
possibility is there and in order to present a more complete picture of
the community property income tax problem, it should be briefly
investigated.
B. The Possible Overruling of Poe v. Seaborn.
Such a possibility has been suggested more than once.2 0 The argument goes back to the "control theory" developed by Mr. Justice
Holmes in several income tax cases preceding Poe v. Seaborn.
To understand the "control theory," however, it is necessary to have
a full picture of the federal government's treatment of the community
property tax problem. Attorney-General Palmer, in 1920 and 1921,
rendered two opinions for the Treasury Department in which he stated
ISFor this statement the court cites, among other authorities, Volz v.
Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920); and 3 MERTENs, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOMvE TAXATION (1942) § 19.29. See 65 Sup. Ct. 103, 89 L. ed.
adv. ops. 71, 76.

19Justice Douglas says of Poe v. Seaborn that it is a "dubious" decision.

He calls attention to the cases developing the "control theory" of taxation,

that is, taxing him who has substantial control of the income, and which
develop a rule contrary to that of Poe v. Seaborn. These cases are dis-

cussed infra, pp 49, 50, 56. See especially his comments in the last paragraph of the dissent.

2'See Oliver, Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income,"

20 TEx. L. REv. 532, 551 (1941); Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41
YALE L. J. 1172 (1932). Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of
Community Property: Income Tax, 30 CALi'. L. REv. 397, 405 (1942).

1945]

INVASIONS OF TAY PRIVILEGES

that because the wife has a vested interest in the community income,
the spouses in all community states, except California, hould be allowed
to make separate returns on such income. 2' California was excepted
because the highest court
of the state had declared her interest to be
22
a "mere expectancy."
Matters stood thus until 1924 when the test case of Robbins v.
United States22 was instigated to determine the community property
situation in California. In this decision the Supreme Court determined
that under the California community property system (as it then
existed) the husband had substantial ownership of the community
property and the wife a mere expectancy upon dissolution of the
community. Such being the case, Justice Holmes, speaking for the
court, inaugurated his "control theory" and concluded that the husband should be taxed for the community income. Said he: "For not
only should he who has all the power bear the burden- and not only is
the husband the most obvious target for the shaft, but the fund taxed,
while liable to be taken for his debts, is not liable for the wife's, Civil
Code, § 167, so that the remedy for her failure to pay might be hard to
find. The reasons for holding him are at least as strong as those
24
for holding trustees under the law."1
The theory, that he who has the power and privilege to dispose of
the income should bear the burden for its tax was next applied in a
case we have noted before, Lucas v. Earl. Justice Holmes again held
that under the general provisions of the tax law the intent was to tax
income to those who earn it.
As Lucas v. Earl bore directly upon the situation of the earned income
of the community, so did Corliss v. Bowers25 present a suggestive
analogy to the taxation of income from community wealth. Here the
taxpayer set up a revocable trust and he questioned the validity of a
specific provision (now INT. REv. CODE § 166) which taxed the income
from a revocable trust to the grantor. Justice Holmes swept aside "refinements of title," and upheld the statute using the following language
which some writers think applicable to the community property situation under the law of most community states:
2132 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 298 (1920)-as to Texas; 32 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 435
(1921)-as to the other community property states.
22 See 32 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 435 at 454-458.
23269 U. S. 315 (1915).
2

1Id. at 327, 328. Note, however, that in 1927 California added a section
to their community property statutes providing that the interests of the
husband and wife were equal in the community estate. CArF. Civ. CODE,
§ 161a (Deering, 1941). This in no way diminished the husband's privileges
of control as manager of the community. But the Supreme Court, per
curiam, found that this change was sufficient to make the income of
California spouses joint and thus confer the blessings of separate returns.
United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. 5. 792 (1931). See also, comment of
Roberts, Jr., on the California situation in the Harmon case, 65 Sup. Ct.
103, 89 L. ed. adv. ops. 71, 73.
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"The income that is subject to man's unfettered command and that
he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his
26

income."1

But when the court came to consider the Seaborn case, 27 the practical
"control theory" which Justice Holmes had developed in Robbins v.
United States was not mentioned. The Robbins case was distinguished
upon the fact of the wife's mere expectancy. And the Corliss and Earl
cases were disposed of by holding that in these cases the husband had
full original ownership of the property and was merely deprived thereof
by private agreement, whereas the husband's earnings are never his
under the community system but that of the community's. Despite the
rather cavalier treatment of his control theory Justice Holmes registered
no objection.
But the "control theory" has not been forgotten. On the contrary,
recent supreme court cases which are discussed under subsequent headings"' have greatly extended the application of this doctrine. The
policy of placing the tax burden upon the one who "controls" the income
has been developed sufficiently for one writer to conclude: "It seems
likely that had Poe v. Seaborn not yet been decided the question pre29
sented in that case would now be decided the other way.
It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Court will not, nor should
it, overrule Poe v. Seaborn. The writer realizes the frequent futility of
such predictions, but, nevertheless, there are sound reasons for the
above statement. Square decisions before may be a small enough
barrier in view of Helvering v. Hallock, ° for example, but stare decisis
still has some weight with the court, even in tax cases.2 1 Continued
administrative practice and continued re-enactment of the income tax
law without change may also be of questionable value in predicting
2r281 U. S. 376 (1930).
26Id. at 378.
27 Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930), represented the first of a
series of cases instituted by the Treasury Department after the Robbins
decision to determine the community property question in other interested
states. The Attorney-General recognized that in each state the community property statutes varied as did the interest of the wife. And,
also, there was the possibility that the Robbins case meant the control
of the manager of the community was the important consideration. The
Attorney-General therefore withdrew his former opinions in order that
the question could be litigated in other states. 35 Ops. Arr'Y GEN 265
(1927).
The other test cases all upheld the spouses' right to divide
community income using Poe v. Seaborn as the guide; Goodell v. Koch,
282 U. S. 118 (1930) (Arizona); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122 (1930)
(Texas); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127 (1930) (Louisiana).
82

Infra, pp. 56, 57.

- Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property:
Income Tax, 30 CALiF. L. RaV. 397, 407 (1942).
20Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), overruled Helvering v.
St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S.39 .(1935), on the basis of an earlier case,
Klein v. United States, 283 U. S.231 (1931).
"' See the statement of Frankfurter, J., in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.
S.106, 118: ". . . stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechani-

cal formula of adherence to the latest decisions."
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future court interpretation. 2 However, the administrative difficulties
in determininig, merely from the effect of overruling the Seaborn case,
the methods in which not only income in the form of salaries, but also
income from property held by the community should be, taxed would
be a strong reason for leaving the community property problem to
legislative process.3 3 Also, an overruling of Poe v. Seaborn would
raise the difficult problem of taxing the past years-a matter which
might prove extremely burdensome.3 4
And not the least among the reasons for the predicted judicial reticence is the fact that this is a delicate problem of state and federal
relationships in which thd court might well Wish for Congressional interpretation before committing itself.
The greatest danger to the community property tax privileges, it
seems to the writer, arises not from a possible overruling of the Seaborn
case, but from amendment of the Internal Revenue Code. It is submitted, moreover, that from the standpoint of equality in federal
taxation, this presents the most expedient method for eliminating special
community benefits.
II.

LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REACH THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY PRIVILEGES

The first legislative attempt to reach community property states
was made in the treasury's plan submitted to the House in 1921. It
proposed to add the following provision to INT. REv. CODE § 213(a)
(which defined gross income):
"Income received by any community should be included in
management and conthe gross income of the spouse having
35
trol of the community property."
The clause was accepted by the House but stricken by the Senate.3
In 1924 and 1934 the same provision was proposed but each time
the Ways and Means Committee put the amendment to death. 7 By
32See comments of Roberts, J., in Commissioner v. Harmon, 65 Sup.

Ct. 3103, 89 L. ed. adv. ops. 71 (Nov. 20, 1944).

That is, if the Seaborn case is to be disregarded, should the community property privilege be entirely eliminated? Or should each spouse
pay a tax on his salary and the manager of the community pay the tax
on the earnings of the property of the community? Or should the husband's control be so substantial that he should be liable for all community earnings, even the wife's, as happened in California after the Robbins
decision. See Helvering v. Hickman, 70 F. (2d) 985 (C.C.A. 9th, 1934). The
writer does not believe that the commissioner would be long in formulating policies, but it is suggested that it might be better if the broad policies
were worked out by Congress.
- 3Similar problems were raised in Helvering v. Haflock, 309-U. S. 106
(1940), and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). See Ray, Proposed
Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income Tax, 30
CALIF. L. REV. 397, 407 (1942).
35 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 114, n. 6 (1930).
3
oIdem.
37 Oliver, Community Property and the Taxation of IFamily Income, 20
TEX.'L. REV. 532, 545 (1942).
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1934, however, another proposal was coming into prominence; this
was unit taxation of the husband and wife.3 8
The two most recent proposals for legislative change of income taxation have been the proposed amendments of the Senate Finance Committee and of the House Ways and Means Committee to the 1941
Revenue Act. The remainder of this article will discuss these two
proposals in the light of their constitutionality and advisability.
A. The Senate Finance Committee Amendment.
The proposal of the Senate Finance Committees" is somewhat of a
reversion to the earlier 1921 and 1924 amendments. The general plan
of the bill is, first, to tax the income of each spouse, whether or not it
is treated as community property under the local law, to the earner.
And, second, the bill considers income derived from community
property as the income of the spouse who has the management and
control of it under the local statutes. The act specifically provides,
however, that income from separate property or other property acquired
with this income should be taxed to the owner of such separate property.
The proposal takes into account the position of the community
property states much better than did the 1921 amendment which simply
taxed the income to the manager of the community. By providing
the first section as to earned income, the amendment eliminates the
possibility that the wife's earnings might be taxed with the husband
under the control theory. That is, upon the theory that the husband
has control of all community income, including the wife's, and therefore
should be taxed for the whole of it. The proviso which continues to
tax the income from separate property to the owner is especially
important in those community states where income from such property
is community income 4 0
On its face, the amendment seems to embody a reasonable theory.
But upon a closer investigation certain constitutional barriers to the
proposal become apparent. The bill's principal difficulty lies in its
disregard for the local law of ownership of both earned and unearned
income. Thus the proposal raises the question of the importance of
local law in tax case determinations of the ownership of income. And
since, as we shall see, the local law is of importance, the proposal
raises the additional question of whether there are some taxable
relationships other than ownership.
1. Local Law and Federal Taxation.
From the previous discussion of Poe v. Seaborn it will be noticed that
the Supreme Court carefully looked to the local law to determine the
88 Paul, Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. op Cm. L. RBu. 41,
84-85 (1937). It was proposed in committee hearings in both 1934 and 1937.
31 The

proposal is found in the Report of the Senate FinanceCommittee

on the Revenue Bill of 1941, H. R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) § 119.
10 See supra, n. 17.
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interest of the respective spouses in the community income. A flood
of other cases can be produced to show the court's regard for the local
law in an attempt to determine how the income tax should be applied.
But there are some distinctions which the court makes in regard to
the effect of local law.
Upon this question the case of Burnet v. Harmel41 is of importance.
Under the law of Texas, unlike that of other states, a gas and oil lease
is looked upon as a present sale of the gas and oil in place. Harmel
made a lease of certain gas and oil rights, receiving cash payments
and stipulated royalties. In making his return under the 1924 Act,
respondent reported the cash payments as gain from a sale of capital
assets, taxable under the statute at a lower rate than other income.
But the Supreme Court refused to differentiate the Texas leases from
those leases where the title to oil and gas passes only upon severance
by the lessee. The court said: "The state law creates legal interests
'42
but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed.
The interest to be taxed here was the income from the oil and gas lease
and the court determined that Congress could fix this interest as it
saw fit with complete disregard for its characterization under state law.
Admitting, then, that the federal law will determine the character
of the income earned from a Texas gas and oil lease, what law will
determine its ownership? Assume, for example, that a Texas husband
owns certain separate property which he has subjected to a gas and
oil lease. Will the court look to the local law which says that income
from separate property is community property and uphold a division
of returns in regard to such income? The question has been answered
in the affirmative. 43 The Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Burnet
v. Harmel in this language:
"Itis true that Texas royalties are held notwithstanding the
local law not to be proceeds of sale but taxable income within
the meaning of the Federal Revenue Acts... . But the question here is not the taxability of the royalties but the ownership of them. Whether the wife owns or does not own one-half
of them in community depends on the state laws, the federal
tax being imposed accordingly. '4 4 (citing Poe v. Senborn).
A number of other cases can be cited to substantiate the principle
that the court has given respectful treatment to the community prOperty law in the past;4 5 and from the above cases it becomes apparent
that the court will likely give more attention to the local law in deter"' 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
2
1'
Id. at 110.
"Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F. (2d) 766 (C.A.A. 5th, 1935).
"Id. at 770.
"See Group No. 1, Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 (1930) -distinguished
in the Harmel case as an example- of local law determining "Whose income is it?"; Blair v. CommisSioner, 300 U. ,S: 5, (1937); Lyeth v. Hoey,
312 U. S. 579 (1941); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940).' ' :-
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mining "Whose income is it?" than in "What type of income is it?"
If, then, the court will look to local law to determine the ownership
of the income being taxed does not the Senate Finance Committee
proposal taxing the earner's salary to the earner and community
property income to the manager run afoul of the rule in Poe v. Seaborn
wherein the wife is said to have a presently vested interest in one-half
of all community income?
2. Two Arguments for Upholding the Constitutionality of the Amendment.
From the above discussion of income tax cases dealing with the
problem of interpreting local law there appear to be at least two
practicable methods of upholding the Senate Finance Committee proposal. First, there is the possibility that the court, aided by a declaration from the legislative branch of the government, might overrule Poe
v. Seaborn. Second, there is a possibility that the court might determine that the tax was levied upon some legal relationship other than
ownership. That is, the court might look to the type of activity being
taxed (as in Burnet v. Harmel) rather than to whose income is being
taxed (as in Commissioner v. Wilson).
a. Poe v. Seaborn and the Senate Finance Committee Proposal.
In determining the taxability of the earner's salary to the earner the
question again before the court would be the scope and validity of the
"unit tax" theory of Lucas v. Earl. In that case Justice Holmes disposed of the contract dividing the spouses' income in these words:
"There is no doubt that the statute can tax salaries to those who earned
them and provide that the tax cannot be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned
it. That is the import of the statute now before us .... 4
Should there be any difference between the case where the law of a
state says that as an incident of marriage the wife shall have a vested
one-half interest in the husband's salary and where the spouses say so
by contract, or, as in the Harmon case, where the law of the state
provides that the wife shall have such an interest if the spouses so
elect?"8 To state, as did the court in Poe v. Seaborn, that the Earl
case is distinguishable because in the "old line" community property

"This is the conclusion reached by Oliver, Community Property and
the Taxation of Family Income, 20 TEx. L. REv. 532, 547-549 (1941), and
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATiON (2d ed., 1938) p. 33.
47281 U. S. 111, 115.

,S The Tax Court in its decision of the Harmon case said: "Contract

forms the basis of that form of the marital property association called the
conventional community. MCKAY, Co1mVruMMT PROPERTY (2d ed.) § 147;
CIVIL CODE OF LOUIsIANA, art. 2807. In states where the community property

law is self-operating a marriage in itself is a voluntary contract or "anticipatory arrangement" by which the contracting parties agree that their

separate earnings shall become community income." C. C. Harmon, 1 T. C.
40 (1942).
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states the earnings are never the property of the husband is close to an
"attenuated subtlety." Does the wife have less an interest in the one
case than in the other?49 Perhaps, with the aid of this amendment,
the court might see fit to overrule the Seaborn case and declare that
in community property states the tax must be paid- by the one who
earns the income.
It must not be forgotten, moreover, that there is another line of
cases which may prompt the court to overrule Poe,v. Seaborn. These
cases develop the "control theory" established by Justice Holmes in
the Robbins and Corliss opinions and bolstered in .many later decisions." Although this theory would do much to strengthen the taxation
of earned income to the earner, it plays a much more important role in
the taxation of unearned income to the manager of the community.
Each spouse has a certain amount'of control over the income derived
from his labor whereas income derived from community property is
,more easily controlled by the manager of the community.
In developing the control theory it has already been noted5 ' that it
would not be difficult for the court to decide that Poe v. Seaborn
missed the real intent of the Robbinscase; that Justice Roberts' distinction of the Robbins case on the basis of the wife's mere expectancy in
California as compared with the -wife's "vested" interest in Washington
seems unjustified; that the controlling factor is the husband's substantial ownership which is similar in California to the other community
property states and upon which Justice Holmes really placed the husband's responsibility for taxation. 52
Thus the court would have sound reasons for upholding the statute by
overruling the Seaborn case, but it is submitted that for reasons stated
in a previous section discussing this same topic, 53 the- court is unlikely
to do so.
b. Taxing Some Legal Relationship Other than -Ownership.
In -order, then, to circumnavigate the difficulties presented by the
Seaborn case, is it not possible that the tax may be placed on some
legal relationship other than ownership? That is, applying the premise
that the court will look to the local law to determine "Whose income?"
but not for "What type of income?", may not the tax be levied upon,
the "type" of income rather than the "ownership" of income?
For example, cannot the Senate Finance Committee proposal be
',See dissenting opinion of Douglas, Jr., in Coimissioner v. Harmon, 65
Sup.
50 Ct. 103, 89 L. ed. adv. ops. 71, 74 (Nov. 20, 1944).
See, for example, Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Helvering
v. Eubank, 311 U.,S. 122 (1940); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1940);
and Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1940).
"'See
supra, p. 50.
52
See Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41 Ymin L.'3J. 1173-1178.
Compare the interest of "the husband in California and Nevada" (as'suggested.by Mr. Bruton) in 32 Ops. ArT'y GEx. 435. 450d452 (Nev.), and 454458 (Calif.).
""
53See supra, p. 48.
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upheld, without overruling the Seaborn case, by classifying the proposal
as an excise tax upon the right to earn a salary, or as a tax upon the
one who has the control of community income? And inasmuch as the
Robbins, Corliss, and Lucas cases, as well as Poe v. Seaborn, were all
classified by the court as interpretations of the Revenue Act, the court
would be justified in fully re-examining the cases in the light of the
Senate Finance Committee proposal.
Although there are other possible legal relationships which might
be taxed,54 it would seem that taxing one's right of control is, perhaps,
the most clearly developed.
The Revenue Act already taxes upon this theory in certain sections.55
The "control" theory of one of these sections was clearly emphasized in
Burnet v. Wells,;6 wherein Justice Cardozo, in validating INT. REv.
CODE § 167 (a) (3), developed the "canalization control" approach. The
court found that the income from an irrevocable trust set up to pay
premiums on insurance for the benefit of the grantor's family should be
taxed to the grantor because he had a "continuing exercise . . . of a
power to direct the application of income along predetermined channels." But it has been suggested, and reasonably so, that such a theory
is more than tenuous when applied to a man's marrying in a community
property state knowing that his earnings will then fall into the community property concept of ownership.
Nor does the control concept of the Clifford case 57 seem applicable
to the community income problem. Here the husband set up an irrevocable five-year trust of the income from his property for the
benefit of his wife. The husband, however, retained broad powers of
control as trustee. And the three themes of the close relationship
between husband and wife, the extensive powers of control and management which the husband reserved, and the short period of the
trust's existence in the end persuaded the court to tax Clifford because
he was still in reality the owner under INT. REv. CODE § 22(a) (defining gross income)."
The essential differences between the trust in the Clifford case and
the community property situation are too much to justify taxing the
husband under the Clifford control theory. The grantor had broader
powers as owner of the corpus than does the manager of the community.
The short duration of the trust is another point of dissimilarity, as is
also the fact that he is the owner of the corpus and will eventually
gain complete control.
"For instance, the tax, as suggested above, could be regarded as an
excise on the right to earn a salary, or on the right to earn income from
property.
" For example, INT. R v. CoDE §§ 166 and 167.
r1289 U. S. 670 (1933).
57309 U. S. 331 (1940).

"The Clifford and Wells cases are well analyzed by Oliver, Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income, 20 Tzx. L. Rzv. 532, 552554 (1941).
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The Code sections, and the Burnet, Clifford, and other cases are
specialized situations where the hazy themes of family benefit, "pressing
social needs," and similar terms are the foundations for taxing the
tecontroller."S' It is difficult to generalize from these cases. This fact
is clearly pointed out in the Clifford case for the court said: "Thus,
where, as in this case, the benefits directly or indirectly retained blend
so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot
say that the triers of fact committed reversible error when they found
that the husband was the owner of the corpus for the purposes of

§ 22(a)."

0

As a final word upon the constitutionality of this proposal, Hoeper v.
Tax Commission of Wisconsin" ' must not be overlooked. Although
this case will be discussed thoroughly under the joint return proposal,
it is well to note that if by that decision A cannot be taxed for income
that is really B's then either the strength of the wife's ownership'under
Poe v. Seaborn will have to be overruled in the light of the Lucas and
Robbins cases, or else some other theory beside taxing the owner of the
income must be devised.
In concluding this discussion of the Senate Finance Committee plan,
it is believed that although there is good sound reasoning behind
upholding such an act, still the difficulties in the way of its passage
are a definite handicap. Furthermore, an amendment which touches
only the community property question will fail to reach the larger
problem where by means of inter-family manipulations the wife is
given a separate income. (This is a problem which will be discussed
more fully under the next section.)
It seems, therefore, that the Senate Finance Committee proposal,
with its possible constitutional difficulties and its narrowness of scope,
does not threaten the community property tax privileges as does the
compulsory joint return amendment which will next be considered.
B. The Proposalof the House Ways and Means CommitteeThe Compulsory Joint Return.
The second of the most recent legislative proposals is the theory of
taxing the family as a unit. This method of solving the community
income tax problem was recommended to Congress in 1933 by theSecretary of the Treasury's proposal: "to require a joint return in the
case of husband and wife living together, each spouse to pay the tax
attributable to his share of the income." 62 The proposal was again
considered in 193713 and in 1941 the Ways and Means Committee
50 See cases supra, n. 50, for further examples of the court's application
of the control theory upon the basis of family relationships and/or retaining powers of control by the original owner.
80 309 U. S. 331, 336.

81284 U. S. 206 (1931).

62 Paul, Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. OF CHL L.
41, 84-85 (1937).

6-Idem.
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formulated a definite bill6 4 which it recommended to the House but
which failed of passage."
The measure, however, is still of live importance and has been
characterized as the "most practical solution of this problem that
promises to be constitutional." 66
The amendment, as it was proposed in 1941, required generally that
any husband and wife living together at any time during their joint
taxable year shall report their income in a single joint return and
compute the tax on the aggregate of such income. A husband and
wife were considered living together if they had not separated with an
intent to permanently abandon the marriage relationship. In regard
to payment, either spouse may elect to have the liability for the tax
apportioned between them so that each spouse will be liable for the
total tax in the same ratio that each spouse contributes to the family
income. Also, if one spouse has no income, deduction, or credit appearing on the return, such spouse is not required to sign or swear to such
return. And finally, the joint tax liability is automatically terminated
upon divorce or legal separation.
1.

Economic Advantages of the Proposal.

The report of the House Ways and Means Committee to Congress
presents a brief in support of the amendment. The brief makes the
following points to illustrate how the act would alleviate inequities in
the present law.
a. Under the law, as it is now written, if the entire income is earned
by the husband the family is required to pay a greater tax than if the
wife had contributed to the family income. For example if the family
has an income of $10,000 a year but it is all earned by the husband,
the tax burden will be measured upon that sum alone. On the other
hand, if $5,000 of the income was contributed by the wife, the family
may divide its income so that each spouse will pay a tax upon $5,000
instead of one spouse paying upon $10,000. These two families have
exactly the same income yet one will pay considerably more in taxes
than the other.6
Since in most cases the husband contributes the whole family income,
under the present law the husband so situated is less favored. He has
a greater tax burden than the husband whose wife contributes to the
family income and who thus enjoys a special advantage since he does not
6,§ 111 of the proposed bill (H. R. 5417), H. R. REP. No. 1040, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
(5Conference Report on the Revenue Bill of 1941, H. R. REP. No.
1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
1This statement was made by Paul, Background of the Revenue Act of
1937, 5 U. of Cm. L. REv. 41, 85 (1937).
67The committee report estimated that in 1941 the tax on $10,000 would
be approximately $1,166 and on $5,000 approximately $440, or a total of
$880 for the family where the wife had a separate income.
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have to set aside as much for her as where she is entirely dependent
upon him.
b. The problem which touches the present topic most closely, of
course, is the manner in which the present law allows a differentiation
between families living in different parts of the country. In the community property states if the husband earns $10,000 a year, this
salary is divided equally between husband and wife for income tax
purposes. On the other hand, a husband earning the same salary in a
non-community property state must report the entire $10,000 as his own.
And there is no way the husband in the non-community property state,
can mitigate his burden because of the Supreme Court's decision that
an assignment of income for personal services does not give the wife the
68
right to make a separate return on the assigned income.
c. The present law also discriminates against a family living in a
non-community property state receiving all or most of its income from
earnings as contrasted with a family receiving all or most of its
income from investments. As has been noted before, the husband
cannot assign part of his earnings to his wife in order to modify his
tax burden. Yet it is common practice for a husband holding considerable investments to make a gift to his wife of part of those investments
and thereby considerably reduce his tax burden while at the same
time keeping the money in the family control.
d. And there are many more instances of reducing tax liability
accomplished by giving the wife (or other members of the family) a
separate income through the means of family gifts, partnerships, and
trusts.
From the standpoint of equal treatment of family income and also
from that of greater revenue to the government, the compulsory joint
return has great advantages. But as in the case of, most legislation, a
determination of its merits is not alone sufficient. The constitutionality
of the measure must also be considered.
2. The Constitutionalityof the Ways and Means Committee Proposal
under the Due Process Clause.
In order more dearly to determine the constitutional barriers to the
adoption of the compulsory joint return amendment, it is necessary to
recapitulate a moment so that the full scope of the proposal may be
realized. The amendment looks at the husband and wife as a unit
and levies the tax on that unit without regard for the separate contributions of the spouses except that their liability may be based upon
the amount they contribute to the total family income. The act; then,
raises 'two constitutional barriers: (a) the possibility that A is' being
taxed for B's income, which is proscribed under the Hoeper case, 9 and
88

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
" Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U. S: 213 (1931).
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(b) the possibility that classifying the family as a taxing unit is an
unreasonable classification.
a. The Hoeper Case.
In this case the Supreme Court had before it certain sections of the
Wisconsin state income tax laws which instituted a system of compulsory joint returns somewhat similar to the proposed House amendment. The Wisconsin act provided that in computing taxes payable
by persons living together as a family, the income of the wife and minor
children under eighteen should be added to that of the father, or head
of the family, and assessed to him. The father was primarily liable
for payment, but if he failed to pay, any other member of the
family whose income was included within the computation would be
liable.
The state assessed against Hoeper a tax computed upon the total of
his and his wife's income (from her separate property) treating the
aggregate as his income. The taxpayer protested against the method of
assessment as violating due process.
The majority of a divided court held the act unconstitutional. Mr.
Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority, based his decision upon four
grounds. (1) First he noted that under the state's Married Women's
Property Act the wife has full independent ownership of her separate
property and the income therefrom. Therefore, by making the husband
liable for the tax on the wife's property the state was taxing as joint
income that which is really separate. It was taxing A for B's income
70
and this it cannot do without violating due process. (2) The majority
refused to validate the tax upon the state's contention that it was necessary to prevent fraud. On this point the court relied upon the
Schlesinger case 7' which had found unnecessary as a classification to
prevent frauds and evasions, a statute which, for purposes of inheritance
tax, classified all gifts inter vivos, effective within six years of death,
as gifts made in contemplation of death. Justice Holmes dissented on
this point. He felt the Schlesinger case was distinguishable.72 (3)
Moreover, Justice Roberts could find no justification for holding this
act to be a regulation of marriage. This phase of the decision is not
within the scope of this discussion, however, since the marriage relation
is entirely the province of state law. But it is interesting to note that
the substance of Justice Holmes dissent was exactly to the contrary.
71 The next two grounds for the decision are answers to the state's
arguments for upholding the taxation of A for B's income.
71
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
72
Justice Holmes would, among other reasons, have justified the tax
for its tendency to prevent tax evasion. He found in the Wisconsin statute
a reasonable relation between the means and the evil which was perhaps
not the fact in the Schlesinger case. And, furthermore, his decision in
Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912) illustrates that
if the state has the right to set up a prohibited classification the fact that
it reaches innocent persons does net necessarily condemn it.
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That is, he felt the act could be upheld as a regulation of married
women's property rights. (4) And finally, the court made the broad
statement, which seems to be purely dictum, that the state has no
power by an income tax law to measure one's tax, not by his own income,
but, in part, by that of another. That is, A's tax may not be measured
in part by the income of B.
Does the Hoeper case invalidate the Ways and Means Committee
amendment? The fundamental holding of the Hoeper case is, as has
been noticed, that A cannot be taxed for B's income. If the committee
proposal can circumvent this prohibited possibility the direct holding
of the Hoeper case will not only be inapplicable but the vitality of the
court's other arguments against the Wisconsin tax will be sapped of
much of their strength.
It seems apparent to the writer that the proposal does circumvent
the Hoeper decision. In that case, the husband, and after him each
contributing member to the family income, was made separately liable
for the whole amount of the family tax liability. The plan of the
amendment, however, is not to tax each spouse for the total tax liability,
for it provides that while the husband and wife may be jointly and
severally liable, they may, at their option, ask that their liability be
apportioned between them according to the amount of their contribution
to the family income. Furthermore, the act provides that if one
spouse contributes no income he shall not be required to sign or swear
to the return, nor shall he be liable in any case, for an addition to
the tax based upon a failure to file a return. Thus, under the proposal
A may not be taxed for B's income,73 the spouses will be "a unit for
computation but individuals for payment."7"
But what of Justice Robert's statement that A's tax may not be
" Notice, also, the statement that A cannot be taxed for B's income is
not all pervasive. A may be taxed for B's income if there are sufficient
justificatory facts. In Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933) a statute tax-

ing the grantor of an irrevocable trust to pay premiums on his life insur-

ance was held constitutional by the majority of the court on the theory
that the grantor's privileges and benefits were so substantial as to justify
taxing him on that basis. Justice Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Suth-

erland dissented upon the ground that the statute taxed A for B's income.

Also, in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1939), Justice Douglas, speaking for the court, held as taxable the grantor of the short term trust for
the benefit of the grantor's wife. He did not mention that the husband
was being taxed for the wife's income. Nor was the point extensively
argued for only the brief of the respondent Clifford mentioned it, and
then only incidentally in a footnote comment. It would seem, therefore,
that in the light of these and other recent cases (e.g., n. 50 supra) the
Supreme Court might decline to follow the Hoeper case.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Ray in his article, Propqsed Changes
in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income Tax. 30 CALw. L.
REV. 397, 427, states that the Wisconsin statute provided that each person

be liable in proportion to the amount he contributed to the total income

but that the majority seemed to overlook this provision.
7'Comment, Purdue, Listen to the Drums-the Compulsory Joint Return, 17 WASH. L. REv. 101, 109 (1942).
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measured in part by that of another? There are at least two answers
to that assertion. In the first place, we have noted before that this
statement seems to be merely dictum. And the only basis for it is a
quotation from Knowlton v. Moore7" which Justice Roberts failed to
mention was itself expressly dictum. 76 Thus the statement that the
measure of A's tax cannot be based partly upon B's income is dictum
based upon dictum: a weak enough argument in itself.
Secondly, that statement is faced by a strong decision to the contrary. In Maxwell v. Bugbee77 the court had before it a statute of
New Jersey which imposed an inheritance tax upon the estate of a
non-resident decedent by taking into account the whole of the deceased's
estate as if it were in New Jersey and then the rate so adduced was
applied to the part of the estate actually in New Jersey. The court
held that a state may validly measure its inheritance tax by including
the value of property outside its jurisdiction.
Thus although New Jersey could tax A (property within New Jersey)
and could not tax B (property outside New Jersey), the state could
measure the tax upon A by taking into account B. If we apply the
rule of the Maxwell case, then, to the income tax problem we find that
although A could not be taxed for B's income, A may, nevertheless, have
the tax on his income measured by taking into account B's income.
And, notice, that in both of these situations B has a close relationship to
A. In the Maxwell case A and B are part of the same estate. In
the income tax situation, A and B are husband and wife.
Professor Loundes has suggested that the Maxwell case provides
a valuable analogy for upholding a family-unit tax proposal. He
says: "The objection to the Wisconsin statute, according to the Supreme
Court, was that it taxed A's income to B. This was not true of the
proposal made to Congress (in 1934). If husband and wife are
required to file a joint return, this does not involve taxing one
spouse for the other's income, nor even measuring the tax on one
spouse by the other's income. Husband and wife are taxed on their
separate incomes. The tax rate for their separate incomes, however,
is determined by the amount of their combined income. This can be
fitted into the pattern of Maxwell v. Bugbee rather than that of Hoeper
v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin. The only problem that need legitimately be considered in connection with such a scheme is one of
classification .. 7, (which shall be done in the next topic under this
section).
" 178 U. S. 41, 77 (1899).
76See Comment, 17 WASH. L. REv. 101, 109, n. 37. For a contrary view
in regard to this interpretation of the Hoeper decision, cf., Oliver, Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income, 20 TEx. L. REv. 532,
552-554 (1941).
" 250 U. S. 525 (1919).
71Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax-Aftermath of
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 49 HARV. L. REv. 756, 772-773 (1936).
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Therefore, aside from the fact that Hoeper v. Tax Commission of
Wisconsin involves a state income tax law and -thus is not a direct
.precedent for a federal act, the case seems to be validly distinguished
from the committee proposal on other grotinds: That is, A is not being
taxed for B's income and the amount of A's tax may validly be measured
-by reference to B's income.
b. The Reasonableness of Classifying Husband and Wife as a Taxable
Unit.
Under this heading will be considered the' other. possible constitutional limitation presented by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The question here deals essentially with the scope of
,Congressional power to classify income for the purposes of taxation.
In other words, may Congress place married persons in a separate
class, and, by reason of the fact that each one of those persons has
a separate income, require each of them to pay a higher tax upon his
or her income than he or she would have been required to pay had
they not been married? Is there present an invalid discrimination
against married persons?
The scope of the power of Congress to classify income for the purposes
of taxation has always been broad. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co.79 demonstrates the general principle that Congress has plenary power to
classify income for the purposes of taxation. Iii this case the court
upheld the power of Congress to levy a tax on income derived from a
business under the corporation form, although persons who carried
on the same .business as a private enterprise were not taxed on their
income.
A case in point presenting an even closer analogy to the compulsory
joint return problem is Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R.80 Here the
court had before it the Revenue Act of 1913 under which a single
person was allowed an exemption of $3,000 but married persons living
together were allowed only an exemption of $4 000. If the husbafid
and wife were separated and not living together, they were allowed an
exemption as two separate persons, that is, $3,000 each. It was contended in the Brushaber case that the act violated the due process
clause in that the provisions allowing the above deductions discriminated between single and married persons living together and those
living separate and apart.
The court denied this contention by saying in part: "* ** In fact,
comprehensively surveying all the contentions relied upon, aside from
the erroneous construction of the amendment which we have previously
disposed of, we cannot escape the conclusion that they. all rest upon
the' mistaken8l ' theory that although there be differences between the
,o220 U. S. 107, 158 (1910).
8o240 U. S. 1 (1916).
Italics supplied.
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subjects taxed, to differently tax them transcends the limit of
taxation and amounts to a want of due process, and that where a tax
levied is believed by one who resists its enforcement to be wanting in
wisdom and to operate injustice, from that fact in the nature of things
there arises a want of due process of law and resulting authority in
the judiciary to exceed its powers and correct what is assumed to be
mistaken or unwise exertions by the legislative authority of its lawful
powers, even although there be no semblance of warrant in the Constitution for so doing." 82 Thus, in a word, different treatment of married and single persons as to exemptions does not violate due process.
A number of other cases can be cited to illustrate the broad powers of
Congress to classify for tax purposes. Important among these decisions
are two recent cases in which the court recognized that a joint return
under the existing law is the return of a taxable unit. 83
In the light of these cases, then, let us look at the scope of the
classification made by the proposed amendment. As the writer has
pointed out before, there is no taxation imposed on one person for the
taxes payable by another; there is only an increase of tax upon the
individual income of each spouse.
This increase of tax may well be analogized to the principle that the
income tax burden should be levied on the ability of the taxpayer to
pay. In pursuance of this principle, Congress has long singled out
the family status as something which should be allowed distinct
recognition. The provisions of the law which allows the head of a
family to take special deductions for his dependents is only a recognition that a man in this position has less ability to pay than one who has
no dependents.
It would seem to follow that the converse should be true. That
is, a man who is receiving economic benefits because the family income
is being increased through earnings of other members of the family
should be in a position to pay a higher tax. Thus Congress has
refused to allow deductions for losses from a sales or exchange of
property between members of a family.84 A man whose wife enjoys
a private income may enjoy special benefits. For instance, he may
not have to carry as much insurance, or be relieved from providing
for small luxury items for his wife.
82240 U. $. 1, 25-26.
"Helvering v. Hanney, 311 U. S. 189 (1940); Taft v. Helvering, 311
U. S. 195 (1940). Both cases upheld the solicitor-general's ruling upon
the optional joint return that: "In cases, therefore, in which the husband
or wife has allowable deductions in excess of his or her gross income, such
excess may, if the joint return is filed, be deducted from the net income
of the other for the purpose of computing both the normal and the surtax." 311 U. S. 195, 197. For other cases showing Congressional power to
classify see United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (1937). Helvering v.
Northwest Steel Mills, 311 U. S. 46 (1940).
"INr. REV. CODE § 24(b) (1) (A).
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It seems reasonable to say, therefore, that the classification of the
family as a unit can be justified under the due process clause.. Any
intimations to the contrary in the Hoeper case, the writer believes,
mut be regarded in the light of the strict holding that A cannot be
taxed for B's- income. The court there did not in fact pass upon the
larger due process questions.8 5 Nor, would the statements. in the
Hoeper case compare' with the finding of Justice Cardozo in Burnet v.
Wells that refinements .of title will be disregarded when they form the
basis for an attack upon the constitutionality of a tax act designed to
plug loopholes.8"
From the authorities above noted, and the present day attitude of
the court as to tax matters, it seems likely that the compulsory joint
return proposal stands in a better position constitutionally speaking
87
than the Senate Finance proposal. .
III. CONCLUSION
But, as has been noted before, the fact that the joint return proposal
is more apt to be held constitutional is not the only reason for preferring
it to the Senate Finance Committee amendment. Another fundamental
reason is that it reaches deeper into the problem of separate returns:
For not only does it cover the community property problem, it also
takes care of inter-family exchanges of property and other manipulations of this character. 8 All of which gives the joint return proposal
a further obvious advantage in that it will raise more revenue.
And there are other factors to consider. Legislative amendment will
eliminate the possibility that Poe v; Seaborn may be overruled and the
attendant confusion that would follow such a judicial pronouncement.
Moreover, administrative detail and difficulties will be reduced, as, for
example, determining whether property is separate or community.
Returns may also be simplified, for such difficulties as allocating
exemptions, credits and deductions will be made easier.

185 See Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41 YALE L. J. 1173-1178
(1932).
86289 U. S. 670, 677, 678.
- 1Magill, The Federal Income Tax on the Family, 20 TEx. L. REv. 150,
164 (1941), expresses this viewpoint.
"The suggestion has been made that including the wife and husband
in a joint return would not eliminate the problem of dividing unearned
income among the family for separate returns for the property could still
be given to the children. It is true that such transactions would occur in
a lesser number of families since not every family has children. But if the
possibilities of tax avoidance are- of sufficient weight-then the act could
be further amended to include the earnings of unemancipated children as
done in the Wisconsin statute in the Hoeper case. It is also true that
property might be giVieff to close6 relatives,: 5ther. than children, living
with the family, or even to close friends. Thus the scope of the compulsory
joint return might be broadened to include these income earners into a
unit. See Comment, 17 WAsH. L. Rxv. 101, 111, n. 49. But such a sweeping
basis for unit taxation would hardly seem necessary since it is unlikely
that the taxapayer would give away his property beyond those over whom
he has substantial control
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Despite these obvious advantages for the compulsory joint return,
it is only fair to note that the amendment's antagonists have found
other faults with it. For example, they maintain that the proposal
will foster illicit relations since only married people are subject to the
tax. Another argument is that the separate property rights of married
women will be decreased by subjecting wives to the family return."
But nothing is said of the husband's rightsl
The answers to such contentions seem obvious. ° They appear to
the writer to be merely unfounded arguments of special interest groups
and should be left at that.
It is not difficult, therefore, to conclude that the compulsory joint
return presents the most dangerous threat to the community property
tax privileges. New fields for tax revenues are being avidly sought by
the government and this bill presents a cogent possibility. It has been
previously suggested in this REviEw that the adoption of the joint
return would achieve the best result from the standpoint of all
interested parties, 91 and from an investigation of the above proposals,
this is the thought of the writer.

89
Most of the objections are found in Hearings Before the House Ways
and Means Committee on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong- 2d Sess.
(1942).
" They are adequately answered irn Comment, 17 WASH. L. Rsv. 101,
108 (1942).
91 1d. at p. 111.

